matrix_sdk_ui/unable_to_decrypt_hook.rs
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// Copyright 2024 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! This module provides a generic interface to subscribe to unable-to-decrypt
//! events, and notable updates to such events.
//!
//! This provides a general trait that a consumer may implement, as well as
//! utilities to simplify usage of this trait.
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
sync::{Arc, Mutex},
time::{Duration, Instant},
};
use growable_bloom_filter::{GrowableBloom, GrowableBloomBuilder};
use matrix_sdk::{crypto::types::events::UtdCause, Client};
use matrix_sdk_base::{StateStoreDataKey, StateStoreDataValue, StoreError};
use ruma::{EventId, MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch, OwnedEventId, OwnedServerName, UserId};
use tokio::{
spawn,
sync::{Mutex as AsyncMutex, MutexGuard},
task::JoinHandle,
time::sleep,
};
use tracing::error;
/// A generic interface which methods get called whenever we observe a
/// unable-to-decrypt (UTD) event.
pub trait UnableToDecryptHook: std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync {
/// Called every time the hook observes an encrypted event that couldn't be
/// decrypted.
///
/// If the hook manager was configured with a max delay, this could also
/// contain extra information for late-decrypted events. See details in
/// [`UnableToDecryptInfo::time_to_decrypt`].
fn on_utd(&self, info: UnableToDecryptInfo);
}
/// Information about an event we were unable to decrypt (UTD).
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UnableToDecryptInfo {
/// The identifier of the event that couldn't get decrypted.
pub event_id: OwnedEventId,
/// If the event could be decrypted late (that is, the event was encrypted
/// at first, but could be decrypted later on), then this indicates the
/// time it took to decrypt the event. If it is not set, this is
/// considered a definite UTD.
pub time_to_decrypt: Option<Duration>,
/// What we know about what caused this UTD. E.g. was this event sent when
/// we were not a member of this room?
pub cause: UtdCause,
/// The difference between the event creation time (`origin_server_ts`) and
/// the time our device was created. If negative, this event was sent
/// *before* our device was created.
pub event_local_age_millis: i64,
/// Whether the user had verified their own identity at the point they
/// received the UTD event.
pub user_trusts_own_identity: bool,
/// The homeserver of the user that sent the undecryptable event.
pub sender_homeserver: OwnedServerName,
/// Our local user's own homeserver, or `None` if the client is not logged
/// in.
pub own_homeserver: Option<OwnedServerName>,
}
/// Data about a UTD event which we are waiting to report to the parent hook.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct PendingUtdReport {
/// The time that we received the UTD report from the timeline code.
marked_utd_at: Instant,
/// The task that will report this UTD to the parent hook.
report_task: JoinHandle<()>,
/// The UnableToDecryptInfo structure for this UTD event.
utd_info: UnableToDecryptInfo,
}
/// A manager over an existing [`UnableToDecryptHook`] that deduplicates UTDs
/// on similar events, and adds basic consistency checks.
///
/// It can also implement a grace period before reporting an event as a UTD, if
/// configured with [`Self::with_max_delay`]. Instead of immediately reporting
/// the UTD, the reporting will be delayed by the max delay at most; if the
/// event could eventually get decrypted, it may be reported before the end of
/// that delay.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct UtdHookManager {
/// A Client associated with the UTD hook. This is used to access the store
/// which we persist our data to.
client: Client,
/// The parent hook we'll call, when we have found a unique UTD.
parent: Arc<dyn UnableToDecryptHook>,
/// An optional delay before marking the event as UTD ("grace period").
max_delay: Option<Duration>,
/// A mapping of events we're going to report as UTDs, to the tasks to do
/// so.
///
/// Note: this is empty if no [`Self::max_delay`] is set.
///
/// Note: this is theoretically unbounded in size, although this set of
/// tasks will degrow over time, as tasks expire after the max delay.
pending_delayed: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<OwnedEventId, PendingUtdReport>>>,
/// Bloom filter containing the event IDs of events which have been reported
/// as UTDs
reported_utds: Arc<AsyncMutex<GrowableBloom>>,
}
impl UtdHookManager {
/// Create a new [`UtdHookManager`] for the given hook.
///
/// A [`Client`] must also be provided; this provides a link to the
/// [`matrix_sdk_base::StateStore`] which is used to load and store the
/// persistent data.
pub fn new(parent: Arc<dyn UnableToDecryptHook>, client: Client) -> Self {
let bloom_filter =
// Some slightly arbitrarily-chosen parameters here. We specify that, after 1000
// UTDs, we want to have a false-positive rate of 1%.
//
// The GrowableBloomFilter is based on a series of (partitioned) Bloom filters;
// once the first starts getting full (the expected false-positive
// rate gets too high), it adds another Bloom filter. Each new entry
// is recorded in the most recent Bloom filter; when querying, if
// *any* of the component filters show a match, that shows
// an overall match.
//
// The first component filter is created based on the parameters we give. For
// reasons derived in the paper [1], a partitioned Bloom filter with
// target false-positive rate `P` after `n` insertions requires a
// number of slices `k` given by:
//
// k = log2(1/P) = -ln(P) / ln(2)
//
// ... where each slice has a number of bits `m` given by
//
// m = n / ln(2)
//
// We have to have a whole number of slices and bits, so the total number of
// bits M is:
//
// M = ceil(k) * ceil(m)
// = ceil(-ln(P) / ln(2)) * ceil(n / ln(2))
//
// In other words, our FP rate of 1% after 1000 insertions requires:
//
// M = ceil(-ln(0.01) / ln(2)) * ceil(1000 / ln(2))
// = 7 * 1443 = 10101 bits
//
// So our filter starts off with 1263 bytes of data (plus a little overhead).
// Once we hit 1000 UTDs, we add a second component filter with a capacity
// double that of the original and target error rate 85% of the
// original (another 2526 bytes), which then lasts us until a total
// of 3000 UTDs.
//
// [1]: https://gsd.di.uminho.pt/members/cbm/ps/dbloom.pdf
GrowableBloomBuilder::new().estimated_insertions(1000).desired_error_ratio(0.01).build();
Self {
client,
parent,
max_delay: None,
pending_delayed: Default::default(),
reported_utds: Arc::new(AsyncMutex::new(bloom_filter)),
}
}
/// Reports UTDs with the given max delay.
///
/// Note: late decryptions are always reported, even if there was a grace
/// period set for the reporting of the UTD.
pub fn with_max_delay(mut self, delay: Duration) -> Self {
self.max_delay = Some(delay);
self
}
/// Load the persistent data for the UTD hook from the store.
///
/// If the client previously used a UtdHookManager, and UTDs were
/// encountered, the data on the reported UTDs is loaded from the store.
/// Otherwise, there is no effect.
pub async fn reload_from_store(&mut self) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
let existing_data =
self.client.store().get_kv_data(StateStoreDataKey::UtdHookManagerData).await?;
if let Some(existing_data) = existing_data {
let bloom_filter = existing_data
.into_utd_hook_manager_data()
.expect("StateStore::get_kv_data should return data of the right type");
self.reported_utds = Arc::new(AsyncMutex::new(bloom_filter));
}
Ok(())
}
/// The function to call whenever a UTD is seen for the first time.
///
/// Pipe in any information that needs to be included in the final report.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `event_id` - The ID of the event that could not be decrypted.
/// * `cause` - Our best guess at the reason why the event can't be
/// decrypted.
/// * `event_timestamp` - The event's `origin_server_ts` field (or creation
/// time for local echo).
/// * `sender_user_id` - The Matrix user ID of the user that sent the
/// undecryptable message.
pub(crate) async fn on_utd(
&self,
event_id: &EventId,
cause: UtdCause,
event_timestamp: MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch,
sender_user_id: &UserId,
) {
// Hold the lock on `reported_utds` throughout, to avoid races with other
// threads.
let mut reported_utds_lock = self.reported_utds.lock().await;
// Check if this, or a previous instance of UtdHookManager, has already reported
// this UTD, and bail out if not.
if reported_utds_lock.contains(event_id) {
return;
}
// Otherwise, check if we already have a task to handle this UTD.
if self.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().contains_key(event_id) {
return;
}
let event_local_age_millis = i64::from(event_timestamp.get()).saturating_sub_unsigned(
self.client.encryption().device_creation_timestamp().await.get().into(),
);
let own_user_id = self.client.user_id();
let user_trusts_own_identity = if let Some(own_user_id) = own_user_id {
if let Ok(Some(own_id)) = self.client.encryption().get_user_identity(own_user_id).await
{
own_id.is_verified()
} else {
false
}
} else {
false
};
let own_homeserver = own_user_id.map(|id| id.server_name().to_owned());
let sender_homeserver = sender_user_id.server_name().to_owned();
let info = UnableToDecryptInfo {
event_id: event_id.to_owned(),
time_to_decrypt: None,
cause,
event_local_age_millis,
user_trusts_own_identity,
own_homeserver,
sender_homeserver,
};
let Some(max_delay) = self.max_delay else {
// No delay: immediately report the event to the parent hook.
Self::report_utd(info, &self.parent, &self.client, &mut reported_utds_lock).await;
return;
};
// Clone data shared with the task below.
let pending_delayed = self.pending_delayed.clone();
let reported_utds = self.reported_utds.clone();
let parent = self.parent.clone();
let client = self.client.clone();
let owned_event_id = event_id.to_owned();
// Spawn a task that will wait for the given delay, and maybe call the parent
// hook then.
let handle = spawn(async move {
// Wait for the given delay.
sleep(max_delay).await;
// Make sure we take out the lock on `reported_utds` before removing the entry
// from `pending_delayed`, to ensure we don't race against another call to
// `on_utd` (which could otherwise see that the entry has been
// removed from `pending_delayed` but not yet added to
// `reported_utds`).
let mut reported_utds_lock = reported_utds.lock().await;
// Remove the task from the outstanding set. But if it's already been removed,
// it's been decrypted since the task was added!
let pending_report = pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().remove(&owned_event_id);
if let Some(pending_report) = pending_report {
Self::report_utd(
pending_report.utd_info,
&parent,
&client,
&mut reported_utds_lock,
)
.await;
}
});
// Add the task to the set of pending tasks.
self.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().insert(
event_id.to_owned(),
PendingUtdReport { marked_utd_at: Instant::now(), report_task: handle, utd_info: info },
);
}
/// The function to call whenever an event that was marked as a UTD has
/// eventually been decrypted.
///
/// Note: if this is called for an event that was never marked as a UTD
/// before, it has no effect.
pub(crate) async fn on_late_decrypt(&self, event_id: &EventId) {
// Hold the lock on `reported_utds` throughout, to avoid races with other
// threads.
let mut reported_utds_lock = self.reported_utds.lock().await;
// Only let the parent hook know about the late decryption if the event is
// a pending UTD. If so, remove the event from the pending list —
// doing so will cause the reporting task to no-op if it runs.
let Some(pending_utd_report) = self.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().remove(event_id) else {
return;
};
// We can also cancel the reporting task.
pending_utd_report.report_task.abort();
// Update the UTD Info struct with new data, then report it
let mut info = pending_utd_report.utd_info;
info.time_to_decrypt = Some(pending_utd_report.marked_utd_at.elapsed());
Self::report_utd(info, &self.parent, &self.client, &mut reported_utds_lock).await;
}
/// Helper for [`UtdHookManager::on_utd`] and
/// [`UtdHookManager.on_late_decrypt`]: reports the UTD to the parent,
/// and records the event as reported.
///
/// Must be called with the lock held on [`UtdHookManager::reported_utds`],
/// and takes a `MutexGuard` to enforce that.
async fn report_utd(
info: UnableToDecryptInfo,
parent_hook: &Arc<dyn UnableToDecryptHook>,
client: &Client,
reported_utds_lock: &mut MutexGuard<'_, GrowableBloom>,
) {
let event_id = info.event_id.clone();
parent_hook.on_utd(info);
reported_utds_lock.insert(event_id);
if let Err(e) = client
.store()
.set_kv_data(
StateStoreDataKey::UtdHookManagerData,
StateStoreDataValue::UtdHookManagerData(reported_utds_lock.clone()),
)
.await
{
error!("Unable to persist UTD report data: {}", e);
}
}
}
impl Drop for UtdHookManager {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// Cancel all the outstanding delayed tasks to report UTDs.
//
// Here, we don't take the lock on `reported_utd`s (indeed, we can't, since
// `reported_utds` has an async mutex, and `drop` has to be sync), but
// that's ok. We can't race against `on_utd` or `on_late_decrypt`, since
// they both have `&self` references which mean `drop` can't be called.
// We *could* race against one of the actual tasks to report
// UTDs, but that's ok too: either the report task will bail out when it sees
// the entry has been removed from `pending_delayed` (which is fine), or the
// report task will successfully report the UTD (which is fine).
let mut pending_delayed = self.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap();
for (_, pending_utd_report) in pending_delayed.drain() {
pending_utd_report.report_task.abort();
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use matrix_sdk::test_utils::{logged_in_client, no_retry_test_client};
use matrix_sdk_test::async_test;
use ruma::{event_id, server_name, user_id};
use super::*;
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Dummy {
utds: Mutex<Vec<UnableToDecryptInfo>>,
}
impl UnableToDecryptHook for Dummy {
fn on_utd(&self, info: UnableToDecryptInfo) {
self.utds.lock().unwrap().push(info);
}
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_deduplicates_utds() {
// If I create a dummy hook,
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
// And I wrap with the UtdHookManager,
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), logged_in_client(None).await);
// And I call the `on_utd` method multiple times, sometimes on the same event,
let event_timestamp = MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now();
let sender_user = user_id!("@example2:localhost");
let federated_user = user_id!("@example2:example.com");
wrapper.on_utd(event_id!("$1"), UtdCause::Unknown, event_timestamp, sender_user).await;
wrapper.on_utd(event_id!("$1"), UtdCause::Unknown, event_timestamp, sender_user).await;
wrapper.on_utd(event_id!("$2"), UtdCause::Unknown, event_timestamp, federated_user).await;
wrapper.on_utd(event_id!("$1"), UtdCause::Unknown, event_timestamp, sender_user).await;
wrapper.on_utd(event_id!("$2"), UtdCause::Unknown, event_timestamp, federated_user).await;
wrapper.on_utd(event_id!("$3"), UtdCause::Unknown, event_timestamp, sender_user).await;
// Then the event ids have been deduplicated,
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
assert_eq!(utds[1].event_id, event_id!("$2"));
assert_eq!(utds[2].event_id, event_id!("$3"));
// No event is a late-decryption event.
assert!(utds[0].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
assert!(utds[1].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
assert!(utds[2].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
// event_local_age_millis should be a small positive number, because the
// timestamp we used was after we created the device
let utd_local_age = utds[0].event_local_age_millis;
assert!(utd_local_age >= 0);
assert!(utd_local_age <= 1000);
assert_eq!(utds[0].sender_homeserver, server_name!("localhost"));
assert_eq!(utds[0].own_homeserver, Some(server_name!("localhost").to_owned()));
assert_eq!(utds[1].sender_homeserver, server_name!("example.com"));
assert_eq!(utds[1].own_homeserver, Some(server_name!("localhost").to_owned()));
}
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_deduplicates_utds_from_previous_session() {
// Use a single client for both hooks, so that both hooks are backed by the same
// memorystore.
let client = no_retry_test_client(None).await;
// Dummy hook 1, with the first UtdHookManager
{
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), client.clone());
// I call it a couple of times with different events
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$2"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// Sanity-check the reported event IDs
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
assert!(utds[0].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
assert_eq!(utds[1].event_id, event_id!("$2"));
assert!(utds[1].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
}
}
// Now, create a *new* hook, with a *new* UtdHookManager
{
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
let mut wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), client.clone());
wrapper.reload_from_store().await.unwrap();
// Call it with more events, some of which match the previous instance
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$3"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// Only the *new* ones should be reported
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$3"));
}
}
/// Test that UTD events which had not yet been reported in a previous
/// session, are reported in the next session.
#[async_test]
async fn test_does_not_deduplicate_late_utds_from_previous_session() {
// Use a single client for both hooks, so that both hooks are backed by the same
// memorystore.
let client = no_retry_test_client(None).await;
// Dummy hook 1, with the first UtdHookManager
{
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), client.clone())
.with_max_delay(Duration::from_secs(2));
// a UTD event
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// The event ID should not yet have been reported.
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 0);
}
}
// Now, create a *new* hook, with a *new* UtdHookManager
{
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
let mut wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), client.clone());
wrapper.reload_from_store().await.unwrap();
// Call the new hook with the same event
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// And it should be reported.
sleep(Duration::from_millis(2500)).await;
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
}
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_on_late_decrypted_no_effect() {
// If I create a dummy hook,
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
// And I wrap with the UtdHookManager,
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), no_retry_test_client(None).await);
// And I call the `on_late_decrypt` method before the event had been marked as
// utd,
wrapper.on_late_decrypt(event_id!("$1")).await;
// Then nothing is registered in the parent hook.
assert!(hook.utds.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_on_late_decrypted_after_utd_no_grace_period() {
// If I create a dummy hook,
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
// And I wrap with the UtdHookManager,
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), no_retry_test_client(None).await);
// And I call the `on_utd` method for an event,
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// Then the UTD has been notified, but not as late-decrypted event.
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
assert!(utds[0].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
}
// And when I call the `on_late_decrypt` method,
wrapper.on_late_decrypt(event_id!("$1")).await;
// Then the event is not reported again as a late-decryption.
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 1);
// The previous report is still there. (There was no grace period.)
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
assert!(utds[0].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
}
}
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))] // wasm32 has no time for that
#[async_test]
async fn test_delayed_utd() {
// If I create a dummy hook,
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
// And I wrap with the UtdHookManager, configured to delay reporting after 2
// seconds.
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), no_retry_test_client(None).await)
.with_max_delay(Duration::from_secs(2));
// And I call the `on_utd` method for an event,
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// Then the UTD is not being reported immediately.
assert!(hook.utds.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert_eq!(wrapper.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
// If I wait for 1 second, then it's still not been notified yet.
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
assert!(hook.utds.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert_eq!(wrapper.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
// But if I wait just a bit more, then it's getting notified as a definite UTD.
sleep(Duration::from_millis(1500)).await;
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
assert!(utds[0].time_to_decrypt.is_none());
}
assert!(wrapper.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
}
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))] // wasm32 has no time for that
#[async_test]
async fn test_delayed_late_decryption() {
// If I create a dummy hook,
let hook = Arc::new(Dummy::default());
// And I wrap with the UtdHookManager, configured to delay reporting after 2
// seconds.
let wrapper = UtdHookManager::new(hook.clone(), no_retry_test_client(None).await)
.with_max_delay(Duration::from_secs(2));
// And I call the `on_utd` method for an event,
wrapper
.on_utd(
event_id!("$1"),
UtdCause::Unknown,
MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(),
user_id!("@a:b"),
)
.await;
// Then the UTD has not been notified quite yet.
assert!(hook.utds.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert_eq!(wrapper.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
// If I wait for 1 second, and mark the event as late-decrypted,
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
wrapper.on_late_decrypt(event_id!("$1")).await;
// Then it's being immediately reported as a late-decryption UTD.
{
let utds = hook.utds.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(utds.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(utds[0].event_id, event_id!("$1"));
assert!(utds[0].time_to_decrypt.is_some());
}
// And there aren't any pending delayed reports anymore.
assert!(wrapper.pending_delayed.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
}
}